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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                           
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
          
         This is an appeal by plaintiff, Donald Urrutia, from an 
order of the district court dismissing his civil rights 
complaint, 42 U.S.C.  1983, as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1915(d), and denying him the opportunity to amend his 
complaint to correct the defects.  The  1915(d) determination 
can be prolonged because the matter often goes first to a 
magistrate judge, who reviews the pleadings and makes a 
recommendation to the district judge.  The principal question 
presented by the appeal is whether the 120 day period of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c)(3) for satisfying the requirements for relation 
back of an amendment that changes or adds a party is suspended 
while the district court considers the  1915(d) question so that 
the amendment will not be barred by a statute of limitations that 
expires after the complaint is filed.   
         The version of section 1915(a) of Title 28 in effect 
during the time when Urrutia's complaint was under consideration 
in the district court provided for the filing of a complaint 
without prepayment of fees by a person who was unable to afford 
the fees.  Section 1915(d), however, permits the district court 
to consider whether an in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous 
or malicious before authorizing issuance of the summons and 
service of the complaint.  Some frivolous complaints can be 
remedied by an amendment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.  Where 
that is so, a district court may not dismiss the complaint as 
frivolous and must permit the amendment.  Denton v. Hernandez, 
504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992).  An amendment to a complaint must satisfy 
the statute of limitations, however.  If the limitations period 
has expired, in order to survive, the amendment must relate back 
to the original complaint under Rule 15(c). 
         Urrutia alleged in his original complaint that the 
police, after handcuffing him, stood by and watched while another 
individual stabbed him.  The original filing, which occurred 
after the magistrate judge ruled that Urrutia could not afford to 
pay the filing fees under  1915(a), was within the statute of 
limitations.  The complaint was, however, defective.  This is 
because, even though it alleged misdeeds by individual police 
officers, instead of naming the individual police officers as 
defendants Urrutia named the Harrisburg police department itself, 
and respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under 
42 U.S.C.  1983.  Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).   
Urrutia's problem was compounded by the fact that the statute of 
limitations expired two months after the complaint was filed and 
about seven weeks before the district court made the  1915(d) 
determination. 
         An amendment to the complaint in which specific police 
officers would be named as additional defendants, or substituted 
as defendants, was proposed by Urrutia and would have cured the 
defect, if it related back under Rule 15(c).  Among the several 
conditions in Rule 15(c) that must be satisfied for an amendment 
to relate back is that the individuals to be added as defendants 
must receive such notice of the institution of the action within 
120 days of the filing of the complaint that they will not be 
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits.  Here, 
however, between the magistrate judge and the district judge, the 
frivolousness determination consumed nearly all of the 120 day 
period established by Rule 15(c) for an amendment to relate back. 
         An in forma pauperis plaintiff has no control over the 
amount of time the district court takes to make the  1915(d) 
ruling.  Where that time period is lengthy, as it was here, it 
renders the relation back doctrine essentially unavailable to an 
in forma pauperis plaintiff, because, by the time the 
determination is made, even if it is that an amendment will be 
permitted, the 120 day period will have expired or be close to 
expiration.  Therefore, we hold that, once a plaintiff submits an 
in forma pauperis complaint within the time provided by the 
statute of limitations, and after the  1915(a) in forma 
pauperisdetermination is made, the 120 day period of Rule 15(c)(3) for 
satisfying the requirements for relation back of an amendment 
that changes or adds a party is suspended while the district 
court considers the  1915(d) question.  If an amendment will 
cure defects in the complaint, it must be permitted, and upon the 
filing of an appropriate amendment, the district judge must order 
issuance of the summons and service of the complaint.  SeeDenton, 504 U.S. 
at 34; see also Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 
195 n.4 (3d Cir. 1990).  Upon the entry of that order directing 
service of the amended complaint, the suspension ends and the 120 
day period of Rule 15(c)(3) for service begins to run.   
         We address today the version of 28 U.S.C.  1915 in 
effect during the time when Urrutia's complaint was under 
consideration in the district court.  On April 26, 1996, and 
while this appeal was pending, the President signed into law the 
omnibus fiscal year 1996 appropriations measure, which contained 
amendments to  1915.  Among other things, section 1915 has been 
amended to require courts to assess an initial partial filing fee 
of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits 
to the prisoner's account; or (2) the average monthly balance in 
the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period whenever 
the prisoner's funds are insufficient to pay the full filing fee.  
In addition, courts are now required to determine whether a 
prisoner has, on three or more occasions, while incarcerated, 
brought an action or appeal in a federal court that was dismissed 
on the grounds that it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  If so, the 
prisoner's new action must be dismissed unless he or she is in 
imminent danger of serious physical injury. 
         A new provision, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, provides that courts 
shall review, before docketing if feasible, a prisoner's 
complaint against a governmental entity or officer or employee of 
a governmental entity to determine whether it may be dismissed as 
frivolous or malicious, or because it fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant who is immune from such relief.  These amendments place 
additional burdens on the courts and are bound to prolong the  
1915 determination.  Our holding today thus retains vitality.  
         Because we believe that the district court erred in 
resolving the  1915(d) question, specifically by refusing 
Urrutia's request to amend his complaint, and because we believe 
that Urrutia's proposed amendment will relate back so long as the 
individual police officers will not be prejudiced in maintaining 
a defense on the merits, we will vacate the order of dismissal, 
and remand for further proceedings. 
                                I. 
         Urrutia's in forma pauperis complaint, consisting of an 
original complaint and an affidavit of poverty, alleged that his 
due process rights were violated when, on June 9, 1993, Denise 
Thompson stabbed him in the hand while he was handcuffed and in 
the custody of the police.  The complaint named as defendants 
Thompson, the Harrisburg Police Department, and the Assistant 
District Attorney of Dauphin County, Sean McCormack.  The 
complaint alleged that the district attorney had been vindictive 
in deciding to prosecute Urrutia and in dropping all charges 
against Ms. Thompson.  Neither monetary damages nor specific 
injunctive relief were requested.  Instead, complaining that he 
must serve seven months because of the district attorney's 
alleged vindictiveness, Urrutia merely asked that "justice be 
served."  Complaint, at Part VI. 
         On April 5, 1995, the magistrate judge, to whom the informa 
pauperis complaint had been referred pursuant to local 
rule, signed a form order on the affidavit of poverty granting 
Urrutia leave to proceed without prepayment of fees.  The 
complaint was filed on the same day.  The magistrate judge did 
not order the complaint to be served and service did not take 
place at this time.  Three months later, in July 1995, the 
magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation in which he 
recommended that the complaint be dismissed as legally frivolous.  
         In recommending dismissal of the complaint prior to 
service, the magistrate judge reasoned that the district 
attorney's decision to drop the charges against Thompson and to 
prosecute Urrutia was immunized from liability pursuant to Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).  Since Thompson was acting as a 
private citizen, no federal constitutional rights were implicated 
by her conduct, and the magistrate judge concluded that no 
liability could be imposed on any member of the police department 
because there had been no allegation of their indifference to 
Urrutia's safety in the complaint.  Finally, he concluded that 
the claim against the police department could not stand because a 
municipality can only be liable under 42 U.S.C.  1983 if a plan, 
policy or custom that it initiated violated a plaintiff's 
constitutional rights, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), and that no such circumstance was 
alleged. 
         Urrutia filed no objections to the report, but did move 
for an extension of time in which to amend his complaint.  In his 
motion, he explained that he wished to amend his complaint "to 
plead his case with more `specificity,'" Motion For Extension of 
Time, at  2, and to add as defendants the police officers who 
had arrested him.  The district court denied the motion, adopted 
the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the court, and 
dismissed the complaint.  Urrutia then filed a timely notice of 
appeal and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.  The 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted by the district 
court.          
         In his brief filed on appeal, Urrutia provides more 
detail about the stabbing.  On the day in question, Urrutia was 
arrested by approximately five Harrisburg police officers based 
on a complaint made by Ms. Thompson.  He contends that his hands 
were placed in handcuffs behind his back, that Ms. Thompson had a 
knife in her hand, which the police ignored, and that they did 
not try to stop her from attacking him.  In his submission: 
              After she (Ms. Thompson) stabbed me once, I told 
              the five (5) police that she had just stabbed me 
              and they did nothing.  She then stabbed me two (2) 
              more times and they did nothing.  Only after she 
              tried to stab me a fourth time did they intervene.  
              At the time of the attack I was handcuffed and in 
              the custody of the police.  If the police had 
              placed me in the police vehicle after they 
              handcuffed me rather than leaving me to be exposed 
              while in a defenseless position, the stabbing 
              could have been avoided. 
 
Appellant's Informal Brief, at 2.  Urrutia suffered scars and 
lacerations as a result of the stabbing. 
                               II. 
         We believe that the allegations of Urrutia's complaint, 
construed liberally in light of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 
520-21 (1972), state a claim of violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments provided that the individual police 
officers can be added or substituted as defendants.  Using a 
familiar referent, he is certainly entitled to the level of 
protection provided by the Eighth Amendment, and deliberate 
indifference on the part of prison officials to violent attacks 
by other inmates is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  Farmer 
v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1976-77 (1994); Riley v. Jeffes, 777 
F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985).  Deliberate indifference means that 
an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 
substantial risk of serious harm.  Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.  
We believe that these principles apply to attacks on persons in 
custody, whether or not by another inmate, and that the 
circumstances described above state a nonfrivolous claim of 
deliberate indifference, at a minimum. 
         However, Urrutia will have a viable claim only if he 
identifies the police officers present following his arrest who 
failed to take preventive action, because respondeat superior 
cannot form the basis of liability under 42 U.S.C.  1983.  SeeRizzo, 423 
U.S. at 362.  In Denton, 504 U.S. at 34, the Supreme 
Court explained that "if it appears that frivolous factual 
allegations could be remedied through more specific pleading, a 
court of appeals reviewing a  1915(d) disposition should 
consider whether the District Court abused its discretion by 
dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to 
amend."  We have held that dismissal under  1915(d) is 
appropriate only when the complaint is truly frivolous and no 
amendment would cure the defect.  Roman, 904 F.2d at 195 n.4.  In 
view of the allegations discussed above, and subject to the 
discussion, infra, we are constrained to hold that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying Urrutia leave to amend his 
complaint to add or substitute the individual police officers as 
defendants and to supplement the factual basis of his claim.   
                               III. 
                                A. 
         We underscore that Urrutia's complaint was submitted to 
the court within the two-year limitations period applicable to 
this action.  However the limitations period expired 
approximately two months after the complaint was filed, i.e. 
after the 1915(a) determination was made.  Thus, an amendment to 
the complaint on remand, in which specific police officers are 
named as additional defendants, will be barred by the statute of 
limitations unless the amendment relates back to the original 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).  See Nelson v. County of 
Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1015 (3d Cir. 1995) (relation back rule 
ameliorates effect of statute of limitations), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 1266 (1996).  
         Rule 15(c) permits amendments of a pleading to relate 
back to the date of the original pleading when: 
                 (1) relation back is permitted by the law that 
              provides the statute of limitations applicable to 
              the action, or 
 
                 (2) the claim or defense asserted in the 
              amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
              transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted 
              to be set forth in the original pleading, or 
 
                 (3) the amendment changes the party or the 
              naming of the party against whom a claim is 
              asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is 
              satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 
              4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the 
              party to be brought in by amendment (A) has 
              received such notice of the institution of the 
              action that the party will not be prejudiced in 
              maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew 
              or should have known that, but for a mistake 
              concerning the identity of the proper party, the 
              action would have been brought against the party . 
              . . . 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
         Subparagraph (1) will not help Urrutia because 
Pennsylvania courts do not take a more lenient approach to the  
relation back doctrine than do federal courts.  See Nelson, 60 
F.3d at 1014 n.4 (citing Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 418 Pa. 
Super. 111, 613 A.2d 595, 599 (1992)).  Subparagraph (3) may 
however permit Urrutia to identify the specific police officers 
who failed to protect him from being stabbed, and either add them 
as additional defendants or substitute them in place of the 
Harrisburg police department.  Id. at 1014; Lundy v. Adamar of 
New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1183 & n.14 (3d Cir. 1994).  For 
Urrutia's claim against specific police officers to relate back 
to the original complaint, all three conditions in Rule 15(c)(3) 
must be satisfied. 
         The first condition, that the claim against specific 
police officers must have arisen out of the conduct, transaction, 
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, is plainly met.  It is similarly clear that 
the third condition is satisfied because Urrutia made a "mistake" 
in identifying the proper parties for this  1983 action.  
Whether or not he intended to sue the Harrisburg police 
department in addition, he certainly intended to sue the 
individual police officers who were present at the time of the 
stabbing.  The initial decision to name the Harrisburg police 
department only and not the individual police officers was not a 
matter of litigation strategy, as is apparent from Urrutia's 
motion for an extension of time in which to file an amended 
complaint.  See Lundy, 34 F.3d at 1183.  Moreover, because, as an 
objective matter, it is a legal blunder to pursue a municipal 
defendant for the misdeeds of individual state actors, it is 
arguable that the proposed additional defendant police officers 
knew or should have known that but for the legal mistake of this 
pro se plaintiff, they would have been direct targets of the 
complaint from the outset.  Urrutia will have to demonstrate that 
he meets this requirement on remand. 
                                B. 
         The second and remaining condition has two 
requirements, notice and the absence of prejudice, each of which 
must be satisfied.  This condition presents the greatest problem 
for Urrutia, because it is subject to a time restriction over 
which he has no control.  The individual police officers to be 
named in the amendment must receive such notice of the 
institution of this action within 120 days of the filing of the 
complaint that they will not be prejudiced in maintaining a 
defense on the merits. 
         Prior to the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c), a plaintiff 
could not relate back the amendment of a defendant's name on the 
complaint unless the new defendant had notice of the suit prior 
to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  Schiavone v. 
Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1986).  The 1991 amendment to Rule 
15(c) changed the result in Schiavone and provided that an 
amendment would relate back as long as the intended defendant 
received notice of the action within the period allowed for 
service of the summons and complaint as set forth in Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 4(m), or 120 days, whether or not the statute of limitations 
had expired in the interim.  Rule 15(c) does not require that a 
plaintiff actually amend his complaint within the Rule 4(m) 
period; it speaks only of notice, lack of prejudice, and reason 
to know of a mistake within that time. 
         In Urrutia's case, an amended complaint naming the 
individual police officers has yet to be filed and the 120 day 
period from the date of the filing of the original complaint has 
long since expired.  We assume that the individual police 
officers have not received notice of this action, because they 
have not been served with a complaint.  Moreover, the district 
court did not authorize service of the complaint on the 
Harrisburg police department.  Thus, the individual officers 
would not have been able to learn about the action through 
department channels. 
         This is not Urrutia's fault.  He submitted his in formapauperis 
complaint a full two months before the statute of 
limitations was due to expire.  The complaint was duly filed 
after the determination was made that Urrutia was indigent, see28 U.S.C.  
1915(a), but three months passed before the Report 
and Recommendation addressing the  1915(d) concerns was filed.  
The statute of limitations expired during this time.  After 
receipt of the report, the district judge denied Urrutia's motion 
for an extension of time to amend and dismissed the complaint.  
Shortly thereafter, the 120 day period expired as well. 
         Because in cases where an amendment will be necessary, 
the delay in making a  1915(d) determination easily could 
consume the 120 day period, we hold that, once a plaintiff 
submits an in forma pauperis complaint within the limitations 
period, and where an amendment will be necessary to cure a 
defect, the 120 day period of Rule 15(c)(3) is suspended until 
the district judge authorizes issuance of the summons and service 
of the amended complaint.  To hold otherwise would eviscerate 
the effect of the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c) and mean that 
similar in forma pauperis actions would be treated differently on 
the basis of how quickly the magistrate judge and/or district 
judge acted on them. 
         This is a matter of first impression in this Circuit, 
but other courts have suspended the running of the statute of 
limitations during the pendency of an in forma pauperis motion.  
The principles guiding those decisions apply equally here, 
because "[r]elation back is intimately connected with the policy 
of the statute of limitations."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory 
committee's note.  In Martin v. Demma, 831 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 
1987) (per curiam), for example, a prisoner and his wife sought 
to file a  1983 action against two police officers.  The 
complaint was received in the district court within the 
applicable limitations period.  However, it was not actually 
filed until after the limitations period expired, because of a 
two-week delay by the magistrate judge in granting an in formapauperis 
motion.  The court held that the date the complaint was 
received in the district court, rather than the date it was 
filed, would determine whether it was barred by the statute of 
limitations.  The court reasoned that some administrative delay 
was inevitable whenever an in forma pauperis motion accompanied a 
complaint, but could not fairly be attributed to the in formapauperis 
plaintiff.  Id. at 71.  See also Jones v. Waters, 563 F. 
Supp. 817, 818 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (tolling two-year limitations 
period governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  5524 in  1983 
action during pendency of in forma pauperis motion). 
                                C. 
         The tolling of the limitations period during the 
pendency of an in forma pauperis motion is particularly common in 
Title VII cases.  In Ynclan v. Department of Air Force, 943 F.2d 
1388, 1391 (5th Cir. 1991), for example, the complaint was 
submitted prior to the expiration of the limitations period but 
was not actually filed until after the limitations period had 
expired.  The court held that the limitations period was tolled 
during the pendency of the plaintiff's in forma pauperis and 
counsel motions.  Another case supporting this view is Paulk v. 
Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1987), where a prose 
plaintiff submitted a complaint naming the Department of the 
Air Force as the defendant and an in forma pauperis motion within 
the limitations period.  Id. at 80 n.1.  After the limitations 
period expired, the in forma pauperis motion was granted and the 
complaint was served on the U.S. Attorney.  After a motion to 
dismiss was filed, the plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint 
to name the correct party.  However, the district court rejected 
the amendment and dismissed the suit because the plaintiff had 
named the wrong federal government defendant and failed to give 
actual notice of the suit to the correct party within the 
limitations period.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed. 
         The court noted that, pursuant to Rule 15(c), service 
on the U.S. Attorney within the limitations period satisfied the 
rule's requirements for relation back of an amendment to change a 
party after the limitations period had expired.  Id. at 81.  
Although the U.S. Attorney had not been served within the 
limitations period, the court held that the district court should 
have granted the plaintiff's request to amend her complaint.  The 
court's explanation in Paulk is especially apposite here: 
            Because plaintiff petitioned for leave to proceed informa 
pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.  1915, the United States 
         Attorney was not actually served with the pro secomplaint for 
more than a month after the complaint was 
         filed and the statute of limitations had run.  This 
         delay is fully expectable due to this Circuit's rule 
         that the district judge may consider whether the 
         complaint is frivolous or malicious before granting 
         leave to proceed in forma pauperis under  1915(a) and 
         authorizing issuance of the summons and complaint 
         (citations omitted).  The delay in deciding to grant 
         this motion could easily consume the thirty-day 
         limitations period and make impracticable the filing of 
         in forma pauperis petitions in such suits.  Tolling the 
         limitations period during the pendency of such a motion 
         . . . allows 28 U.S.C.  1915 and Rule 15(c) to operate 
         harmoniously, instead of denying the benefits of . . . 
         Rule 15(c) to the very plaintiffs who are most likely 
         to need it. 
 
Id. at 82-83.  See also Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 
1156, 1161 (8th Cir. 1989) (same).  
                                D. 
         In sum, we hold that the 120 day period of Rule 
15(c)(3) for satisfying the requirements for relation back of an 
amendment that changes or adds a party is suspended once a 
plaintiff submits the original in forma pauperis complaint within 
the time provided by the statute of limitations, and the  
1915(a) in forma pauperis determination is made.  The 120 day 
period remains suspended while the district judge considers the  
1915(d) frivolousness question.  If an amendment is necessary to 
cure defects in the complaint and an appropriate one is 
proffered, it must be permitted, see Roman, 904 F.2d at 195 n.4, 
and upon the filing of an appropriate amendment, the district 
judge must order issuance of the summons and service of the 
amended complaint.  Upon the entry of that order directing 
service of the amended complaint, the suspension ends and the 120 
day period of Rule 15(c)(3) begins to run.  Cf. n.14, supra.  We 
agree with the Seventh Circuit in Paulk, supra, that there is a 
need for 28 U.S.C.  1915 and Rule 15(c) to operate harmoniously 
to avoid denying the benefits of Rule 15(c) to the very 
plaintiffs who are most likely to need it.  See supra at 20-21. 
         Under this holding, the order of the district court 
dismissing this action under 28 U.S.C.  1915(d) must be vacated 
and the case remanded for further proceedings.  On remand, 
Urrutia should be granted leave to file his amended complaint.  
If he does so and properly names the individual police officers, 
the district court should direct service of the amended 
complaint.  If service of the amended complaint is made within 
the 120 day period provided for in Rule 4(m), such period to 
commence upon entry of the order directing that the amended 
complaint be served, Urrutia will have satisfied the requirement 
of notice, because actual service of the complaint clearly 
satisfies the notice requirement.   
         The additional defendants may, of course, move for 
dismissal of the amended complaint as barred by the statute of 
limitations if Urrutia does not show that they should have known 
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against them, or if 
they can show that they will be prejudiced in maintaining a 
defense.  The prejudice must be actual, not hypothetical.  See, 
e.g., Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(demonstrating prejudice requires party seeking dismissal of 
amended complaint to show that it was unfairly denied opportunity 
to present facts or evidence which it would have presented had 
the amendments been timely).  We will leave the determination of 
these questions to the district court in the first instance. 
                               IV. 
         The magistrate judge suggested other possible bases for 
dismissal of the complaint, namely, claim preclusion and improper 
venue.  In answer to a question in the form civil rights 
complaint asking for a description of any lawsuits dealing with 
the same facts involved in the present action, Urrutia identified 
a prior suit against the Harrisburg Police Department, Denise 
Thompson, and Sean McCormack.  The suit was filed in the "Dauphin 
County Courts," Complaint, at Part V.F.1., and was dismissed. 
         Urrutia may be precluded from bringing his civil rights 
claim in federal court.  See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 
90, 96-97 (1980) (res judicata applies to  1983 cases).  "When a 
prior case has been adjudicated in a state court, federal courts 
are required by 28 U.S.C.  1738 to give full faith and credit to 
the state judgment and, in section 1983 cases, apply the same 
preclusion rules as would the courts of that state."  Edmundson 
v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citations omitted).  Hence, in this case, Pennsylvania law 
determines if Urrutia's  1983 claim should be barred. 
         Under Pennsylvania law, a final judgment on the merits 
by a court of competent jurisdiction will bar any identical 
future action between the parties and their privies.  See, e.g., 
Hopewell Estates, Inc. v. Kent, 435 Pa. Super. 471, 476, 646 A.2d 
1192, 1194 (1994).  All matters which might have been raised in 
the former suit as well as those that actually were raised are 
res judicata in a subsequent proceeding.  Id.  "In determining 
whether res judicata should apply, a court may consider whether 
the factual allegations of both actions are the same, whether the 
same evidence is necessary to prove each action and whether both 
actions seek compensation for the same damages."  Hopewell 
Estates, 435 Pa. Super. at 477, 646 A.2d at 1194-95 (citing Mintz 
v. Carlton House Partners, 407 Pa. Super. 464, 475, 595 A.2d 
1240, 1246 (1991)). 
         Even though Urrutia made a vague representation that 
his present federal case arises from the same facts as in his 
state court case (see supra p. 23), we are unable to determine if 
the federal civil rights claim should have been raised in the 
prior suit, or, was raised and fully litigated before and, 
therefore, cannot now be relitigated.  Neither could the 
district court make this determination on the facts before it. 
         In the usual case, if a  1915(d) dismissal based on 
the doctrine of res judicata is contemplated, the district court 
should have on hand the complaint and dismissal order from the 
prior suit.  See Logan v. Moyer, 898 F.2d 356, 357 (3d Cir. 
1990).  Only then can the district court have the requisite 
certainty that the relevant facts and issues support a 
determination of claim preclusion.  In this case, in view of the 
anticipated addition of individual police officers as defendants, 
we think the better practice would be for the district court to 
leave the defense of res judicata, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), to 
the defendants to plead and develop as a basis for dismissal of 
the amended complaint. 
         Similarly, because there is no way of knowing at this 
time where any of the proposed additional defendant police 
officers reside, the defendants also should be the ones to raise 
a challenge of improper venue, if such a challenge is 
appropriate.  At the time of filing of the complaint, Urrutia was 
incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Somerset, 
Pennsylvania.  He filed this action in the judicial district in 
which Somerset is located, the Western District of Pennsylvania.  
The June 1993 arrest by Harrisburg police officers took place in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, located in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.   
         Section 1983 contains no special venue provision.  SeeSinwell v. 
Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976).  Therefore, the 
general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C.  1391 apply.  Pursuant to 
 1391(b): 
                 A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not 
              founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, 
              except as otherwise provided by law, be brought 
              only in (1) a judicial district where any 
              defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the 
              same State, (2) a judicial district in which a 
              substantial part of the events or omissions giving 
              rise to the claim occurred, . . . or (3) a 
              judicial district in which any defendant may be 
              found, if there is no district in which the action 
              may otherwise be brought.  
 
A defense of improper venue may be waived.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(h)(1). 
         Because the arrest took place in Harrisburg, venue 
would be appropriate in the Middle District.  If venue is not 
also appropriate in the Western District, because subparagraph 
(1) cannot be satisfied, the defendants should seek recourse 
pursuant to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motion prior to answering 
the amended complaint.  If it appears from the motion that 
venue is not proper in the Western District, the district court 
should transfer the action to the Middle District pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1406(a).  See also Cottman Transmissions Sys., Inc. v. 
Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1994).     
                                V. 
         The magistrate judge also concluded that defendant 
McCormack was immune from suit because the decision to prosecute 
is a protected function.  However, the absolute immunity for 
prosecutorial functions only applies in a suit for money damages.  
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.  Urrutia did not request money damages 
in the complaint.  On the other hand, Urrutia's request that 
"justice be served" is too nebulous to constitute a request for 
injunctive relief.  In amending his complaint on remand Urrutia 
must specify whether he is seeking money damages or injunctive 
relief or both.  If he is seeking injunctive relief, he should be 
specific about what he is seeking.  If he continues to rely 
solely on his request for "justice," the district court may 
dismiss the complaint.  If what Urrutia seeks is a release from 
custody, his complaint sounds in habeas corpus, not civil rights, 
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 1500 (1973), and an 
assistant district attorney would not be a proper respondent, seeRule 
2(a), Rules Governing  2254 Cases.  And if he seeks 
damages, the district court must consider the Imblerprosecutorial immunity 
issue. 
                               VI. 
         Finally, Urrutia has alluded in his brief on appeal to 
an additional claim for false imprisonment arising from the June 
1993 arrest, and he has also described in detail a new claim of 
excessive use of force in effecting a different arrest on July 
26, 1993.  Urrutia is free to add other causes of action 
concerning the June 1993 arrest pursuant to an amendment to the 
complaint (see also supra p. 10 n.7), but an amendment adding 
claims arising from a different arrest on a different day in 1993 
will not relate back and would appear to be barred by the statute 
of limitations.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).  
          
         The order of the district court dismissing the 
complaint will be vacated and the case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                
  
